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Abstract 
Although researchers have consistently demonstrated the importance of confidence in public insti-
tutions like the courts, relatively little attention has been paid to understanding what confidence 
itself really is. This article presents data from two samples of community members, thereby building 
on and extending a preliminary investigation that sought to understand constructs related to confi-
dence in state courts with student samples. Structural equation modeling results provide support for 
the dimensionality of the measures and indicate that dispositional trust has little to no independent 
effect on confidence. However, tendency to trust in governmental institutions, cynicism toward the 
law, and felt obligation to obey the law are important predictive constructs. The current results are 
important both for researchers seeking to understand confidence in the courts and the judges and 
administrators who would seek to increase it. 
 
Keywords: confidence, trust-related constructs, public perceptions, structural equation modeling, 
deconstructing confidence 
 
Understanding confidence in the courts is a critical pursuit, not only in its own right but 
also because it provides important insights into the interactions between citizens and gov-
ernmental institutions. Recognizing this importance, court researchers in the United States 
have investigated confidence (Benesh, 2006; Benesh & Howell, 2001) and a wide array of 
related constructs like support (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992; Wenzel, Bowler, & Lanoue, 2003), 
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satisfaction (Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Van Ryzin, 2006), perceptions of legitimacy 
(Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and procedural justice 
(Mondak, 1993; van den Bos, 2001) and so on. 
This important literature is limited, however, by persisting confusion about how the 
constructs are similar or distinct, and this confusion is not unique to the courts. The “con-
ceptual morass” (Barber, 1983, p. 1) in which the construct of confidence in institutions is 
embedded is characterized by constructs that vary along numerous theoretically and em-
pirically important dimensions. Such dimensions include whether the constructs are con-
ceived as more global and general versus more situational and particularized or rational 
as opposed to normative, operationalized as behaviors versus psychological states, or fo-
cus inwardly (on the trust levels of the trustor) versus outwardly (on the trustworthiness 
of the trusted; Hardin, 2006; Nannestad, 2008). From other social sciences literatures, we 
know that such variations can have an impact on empirical findings. For example, 
measures of self-efficacy are less predictive if they are not set at the same level of generality 
as the target behavior (Bandura, 2001a, 2001b), and variations in valence have also been 
found to be important, as independence has been found between constructs such as posi-
tive and negative affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
 
Deconstructing confidence 
 
Some researchers have initiated attempts to clarify the nature and characteristics of differ-
ent specific conceptualizations and operationalizations of confidence. For example, Cook 
and Gronke (2005) argued that active distrust was not the same as a lack of active trust. 
They investigated the meaning of common measures of trust and confidence in govern-
mental institutions (which are typically positively valenced and vary in globality), as com-
pared to a measure of active trust-distrust in government. They noted that, “given 
accumulating evidence of the predictive power of such measures, we need to figure out 
just what they mean” (p. 785). Using data from a national telephone survey sample, they 
created separate models for each of the different measures of trust or confidence in gov-
ernment by individually regressing each measure on demographics and variables related 
to connectedness, current evaluations of institutions, and ideology. They found that many 
of the predictor coefficients differed significantly among the different measures. For exam-
ple, their measure of active trust-distrust, measured by asking respondents to place them-
selves on an 11-point scale ranging from strong distrust to strong trust of government, 
appeared to be more closely related to global dispositions such as political interests and 
dispositional trust, and less influenced by specific and immediate political contexts. Mean-
while, trust-in-government, as measured by a positively valenced question used on the 
National Election Survey (“How much of the time do you think the government in Wash-
ington can be trusted to do what is right?”), was uniquely predicted by one’s current fi-
nancial situation. Finally, average confidence across a number of specific institutions 
(whether averaged across the three branches of government or across 13 different govern-
ment institutions) was uniquely predicted by education and partisanship. 
More specifically relevant to confidence in the courts, Gibson et al. (2003) decomposed 
the variance of the General Social Survey’s (GSS) single-item measure of confidence in the 
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US Supreme Court that had an inward focus on the trustors’ confidence levels, and com-
pared it to the decomposition of a multi-item measure of institutional loyalty to the court 
that focused outwardly on the court (e.g., whether it favors some groups, and whether it 
should be eliminated). Using data from a nationally representative survey of adults, the 
authors regressed measures of these two constructs on each other and on general affect 
and specific support predictors. Because of the limited covariance shared by the confidence 
and loyalty measures and the fact that the independent predictors of each construct dif-
fered, the authors concluded that the measures could not reasonably be considered equiv-
alent. Gibson and colleagues note the importance of their research for understanding what 
these measures of confidence and institutional loyalty are actually measuring. Their re-
search indicates that people may be dissatisfied with the court and express low confidence 
in it, while still remaining loyal enough not to want to do away with it. 
In order to shed further light on the separability and explanatory power of confidence-
related constructs as predictors of different operationalizations of confidence in the courts, 
we examined the dimensionality and predictive ability of four trust-related constructs (dis-
positional trust, trust in institutions, obligation to obey the law, and cynicism toward the 
law) on confidence in the courts measured either as unspecified confidence, perceived 
trustworthiness, or specific expectations of the courts (Hamm et al., 2011). The predictor 
constructs were chosen because they were both important theoretically relevant trust-re-
lated constructs in the literature, and because they varied on the potentially important di-
mensions of globality (dispositional trust is very global, trust in government is more 
specific, specific expectations are even more specific), valence (cynicism is negatively va-
lenced while trust in government is positively valenced), and expectational focus (e.g., as-
sessing expectations of one’s self to obey the law versus specific expectations of the 
institution). The influence of these constructs on different measures of confidence in the 
courts was evaluated both cross-sectionally and, for one of the confidence operationaliza-
tions (perceived trustworthiness), longitudinally. Our sample comprised college students 
in two separate studies (total N was 324: 120 participants in Study 1, 204 in Study 2). Our 
results (see tables 1 and 2, below) revealed that each of the four predictor constructs ac-
counted for significant proportions of the variance in our outcome confidence measures. 
Significantly, however, the importance of these four constructs varied across studies and 
operationalizations of confidence (we treat this further in the discussion). 
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Table 1. Study 1 unstandardized B (and standardized β) and standard error (SE) values for 
predictors in multiple regression models predicting each of the three confidence in the courts 
measures 
 Confidence in the courts measures 
 Unspecified  Trustworthiness  Specific expectations 
Predictor B (β) SE  B (β) SE  B (β) SE 
Dispositional trust .27 (.33) .07***  .33 (.22) .05***  .11 (.18) .05* 
Trust in institutions .21 (.13) .15  .12 (.09) .11  32 (.26) .11** 
Obligation to obey 
the law .03 (.03) .08  .15 (.21) .06*  .09 (.13) .06 
Cynicism toward 
the law –.28 (–.31) .08**  –.26 (–.36) .06***  –.17 (–.26) .06** 
Model statistics 
adj R2 = .31, 
F(4,106) = 13.21**  
adj R2 = .46, 
F(4,97) = 22.46**  
adj R2 = .32, 
F(4,104) = 13.71** 
Source: Hamm et al. (2011), table 3: study 1 item total regressions table. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 2. Study 2 unstandardized B (and standardized β) values and standard errors (SE) for 
predictors in three models predicting confidence in the courts operationalized as perceived 
trustworthiness 
 Model 
 T1 PVs predicting 
T1 Trustworthiness  
T2 PVs predicting 
T2 Trustworthiness  
T1 PVs predicting 
T2 Trustworthiness 
Predictor variables 
(PVs) B (β) SE  B (β) SE  B (β) SE 
Dispositional trust .13 (.14) .06*  .15 (.18) .07*  .13 (.15) .10 
Trust in institutions .28 (.28) .08***  .32 (.39) .07***  .39 (.37) .12** 
Obligation to obey .13 (.19) .05*  .14 (.21) .06*  .16 (.22) .08* 
Cynicism toward 
the law –.16 (–.20) .06**  –.12 (–.16) .06†  –.12 (–.14) .09 
Model statistics 
adj R2 = .32, 
F(4,164) = 20.41***  
adj R2 = .41, 
F(4,94) = 17.84***  
adj R2 = .34, 
F(4,63) = 9.56*** 
Source: Hamm et al. (2011), table 7: study 2 item total regressions. 
Note: T1 = Time 1, T2 = Tme 2. PV = predictor variable. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; †p < .10 
 
Thus, these studies of college students left some important questions unaddressed. 
Chief among these is generalizability. Because our studies included only students, the gen-
eralizability of the findings to other samples could arguably be limited. Although students 
are often likely to have as much and potentially more contact with the courts than the 
general public (Hayford & Frutsenberg, 2008; Newman, Shell, Major, & Workman, 2006), 
we found that only a small minority of our participants reported having any contact with 
the courts in our previous work (Hamm et al., 2011), thus providing no indication whether 
the results would hold in adult samples who have more knowledge about the courts or 
direct experience with them. Additionally, the limited statistical techniques used in the 
college student studies necessarily resulted in some levels of imprecision in the results. 
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Exploratory factor analyses, lacking a significance test of the constructs’ dimensionality, 
rely on the researcher’s interpretation of the factor structure, and classical test theory ap-
proaches treat all of the variance in an item as the “true score,” leaving room for the pos-
sibility that correlations between items may not indicate real associations between the 
underlying constructs. 
 
The present research 
 
The primary purpose of the current research was, therefore, to replicate and extend our 
previous findings using more relevant samples and more rigorous statistical techniques. 
Therefore, in line with our previous work, we hypothesize (see fig. 1): 
1) The analyses will provide evidence that the five predictor and criterion scales are 
separable (as assessed by a confirmatory factor analysis) and reliable (as assessed 
by model-based reliability estimates) indicators of the constructs. 
2) The four predictor scales will account for independent variance in the criterion, 
confidence in the courts (as assessed by structural regressions). 
The current study utilizes structural equation modeling to test the dimensionality and re-
lationships of the constructs in two distinct samples—adults drawn from a Midwestern 
community public engagement effort and misdemeanants from across a Midwestern state 
whose perceptions are simultaneously most critical to the courts and potentially different 
from those of less experienced or knowledgeable (i.e., sophisticated) individuals. The pre-
sent study’s use of these more sophisticated samples is important because, as noted, our 
previous research sampled students who reported having very little contact with the 
courts. Aside from generalizability of results, however, the use of more sophisticated sam-
ples could also have important implications for the relationships between trust-related 
constructs and confidence in the courts. That is, because we know that individuals have 
generally low levels of knowledge of political institutions in the US (Delli Carpini, & 
Keeter, 1996) and that individuals tend to process political and policy information differ-
ently based on their level of knowledge regarding an institution or issue (Zaller, 1992), it 
is possible that trust-related constructs may relate to confidence in the courts differently in 
more sophisticated samples as a result of their increased levels of knowledge and experi-
ence relevant to the institution. Other studies of trust provided some support for this pos-
tulation, consistently finding that sophistication affects the influence of trust-related 
constructs on other attitudes and behavior (Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & PytlikZillig, 2012; 
Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000; van den Bos, 2001; Winter & Cvetkovich, 2008). Although so-
phistication is not directly measured in the present research, consideration of samples who 
likely (community members) and by definition (misdemeanants) have more knowledge 
and experience with the courts in light of our findings with less sophisticated samples (stu-
dents) provides potentially important insights into the influence of this construct. 
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Figure 1. Model of confidence in state courts. Note: For ease in interpretation we use a 
graphical representation of the model structure following the example of Brown (2006) 
where boxes are measured variables and circles are latent factors. In confirmatory factor 
analyses, unidirectional arrows pointing to the factor are factor loadings. In structural re-
gressions, unidirectional arrows are regression paths and in both those pointing to the 
item from a nonoutlined number are error variances. Bidirectional arrows always indicate 
correlations. Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Governmental In-
stitutions; Cynicism = Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation to Obey the 
Law. 
 
Method 
 
Constructs and measures 
The measures of confidence and the trust-related constructs (dispositional trust, trust in 
governmental institutions, cynicism toward the law and obligation to obey) that were used 
in both studies were taken from our previous work (see table 3 in the present article for 
items). For all items, negatively worded items were recoded before analysis so that higher 
numbers indicated more positively valenced constructs (e.g., more dispositional trust, less 
cynicism, etc.). 
 
Table 3. Study 1 and 2 item-level statistics 
 Study 1 (n = 173)  Study 2 (n = 391) 
Scale/item M SD r Item.Total  M SD r Item.Total 
Confidence in the courts        
(1) Most judges in my community do their 
      job well. 3.71 .67 .74*  3.58 1.07 .81* 
(2) Most judges in my community treat 
      people with respect. 3.77 .64 .74*  3.47 1.17 .82* 
(3) The basic rights of citizens in my commu- 
      nity are well protected by the police. 
3.70 .85 .63* 
 
3.54 1.12 .78* 
(4) The judges in my community have too 
      much power. 3.47 .84 .72*  2.85 1.09 .70* 
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(5) Most judges in my community are 
      dishonest. 4.08 .79 .74*  3.57 1.07 .76* 
(6) Most judges in my community treat some 
      people better than others. 3.10 .87 .69*  2.46 1.25 .72* 
Dispositional trust        
(1) Generally speaking, would you say that 
      most people can be trusted, or that you 
      can’t be too careful? 2.66 .97 .88*  2.76 1.04 .82* 
(2) Do you think that most people would 
      take advantage of you if they got the 
      chance or would they try to be fair? 2.57 .97 .93*  2.87 .95 .84* 
(3) Would you say that most of the time 
      people try to be helpful or that people are 
      just looking out for themselves? 2.46 .93 .90*  2.83 1.04 .82* 
Trust in governmental institutions        
(1) How much of the time do you feel you 
      can trust the federal government in 
      Washington DC to do what’s right? 3.36 .81 .70*  3.15 .88 .84* 
(2) How much of the time do you feel you 
      can trust the state government to do 
      what’s right? 2.85 .69 .66*  3.25 .88 .92* 
(3) How much of the time do you feel you 
     can trust the local government to do 
     what’s right? 2.57 .69 .80*  3.09 .97 .88* 
Obligation to obey the law        
(1) I feel I should accept the decisions made 
      by legal authorities. 2.45 .78 .80*  3.58 1.16 .83* 
(2) People should obey the law even when it 
      goes against what they think is right. 2.27 .88 .83*  3.62 1.23 .85* 
Cynicism toward the law        
(1) The law represents the values of people 
      in power rather than the values of people 
      like me. 3.04 1.04 .87*  2.41 1.22 .81* 
(2) People in power use the law to control 
      people like me. 2.85 1.00 .86*  2.64 1.28 .88* 
(3) The law does not protect my interests. 2.46 .85 .79*  3.10 1.25 .82* 
Note: Numbers to the left of the question wording correspond to the numbers in the figures. Items grouped 
by a priori scale. r Item.Total is the correlation between the item and the sum of the items on that specific scale. 
Responses to the confidence in the courts, obligation to obey, and cynicism items were measured on a five-
point (1 = “strongly agree,” 5 = “strongly disagree”) Likert scale with negatively worded items reverse coded 
before analysis. Responses to the trust in governmental institutions items were measured on a five-point scale 
labeled from “never” to “always” and reverse coded. Dispositional trust used item-specific five-point bipolar 
scales anchored with different statements at the extremes (e.g., “people try to be helpful” versus “people look 
out only for themselves”). 
* p < .05 
 
Confidence in the courts emphasized an outward focus on the trustworthiness of the 
courts. In line with the definition of confidence proposed by Earle, Siegrist, and Gutscher 
(2007), this scale focuses on perceptions of competence and the general performance of the 
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courts using six items developed by Tyler and Huo (2002) (e.g., “most judges in my com-
munity do their job well” or “most judges in my community are dishonest,” reverse 
scored). These items were accompanied by 1–5 Likert-type response scales labeled from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
Dispositional trust is a global construct, most often defined as the extent to which the 
focal person trusts others across situations (Kramer, 1999; Rotter, 1967, 1971). In other 
words, dispositional trust is roughly the level of trust a focal person will afford a target if 
no other information is available upon which to base the trust evaluation. Even though 
other constructs are likely to be more predictive of specific levels of trust in a given insti-
tution, conceptually, dispositional trust represents the starting point from which the indi-
viduating information increases or decreases trust. Despite criticism for its failure to ac-
count for situational characteristics like the identity of the trusted (or untrusted) entity 
(e.g., Hardin, 2006; Nannestad, 2008), it is nevertheless an important construct. Addition-
ally, because it is always relevant, it can be measured, regardless of the sophistication of 
the respondent with the specific institution. This construct was measured as in the General 
Social Survey and the National Election Study, using three bipolar items regarding partic-
ipants’ belief about the motives of “most people.” The five-point scales were labeled only 
at the end points (e.g., “generally speaking, would you say that (1) most people can be 
trusted, or that (5) you can’t be too careful?”). 
Trust in governmental institutions is defined as the average extent to which the focal per-
son trusts governmental institutions generally. Researchers like D’Amico (2003) and May-
er and colleagues (2006) have argued that as individuals gain more information about a 
target, this individuating information becomes relevant to a trust evaluation. We therefore 
conceptualized this construct as very similar to dispositional trust but in regard to a more 
specific target group—namely, governmental institutions. In other words, it is the average 
extent to which the focal person trusts a governmental institution about which he or she 
has no additional information, and it is therefore the anchor level of trust from which he 
or she would adjust in light of other information relevant to the specific institution, in this 
case, the courts. Much like global dispositional trust, this construct fails to account for in-
dividuating information that could be available to the focal person (other than that it is a 
governmental institution); however, its role as the default level of trust afforded an insti-
tution of government merits its inclusion in our model. To assess trust in governmental 
institutions, we included three items taken from the National Election Study. These items 
shared a common question stem which asked how often the participant trusts the federal, 
state, and local government to “do what is right.” The items were measured on five-point 
scales labeled as follows: 1 = “never,” 2 = “rarely,” 3 = “sometimes,” 4 = “very often,” and 
5 = “always.” 
Because the central focus of the courts is the interpretation of and adherence to the law, 
the remaining two constructs focus upon the focal person’s perceptions of and resultant 
reactions to the law itself. The first of these constructs was cynicism toward the law. Re-
searchers have often argued that in order to capture confidence more completely, both 
positive and negative conceptualizations must be measured (Cook & Gronke, 2005; 
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). We define cynicism in line with Tyler and Huo (2002), 
who argue that cynicism toward the law is a belief that the law “operate[s] to protect the 
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advantaged” (p. 108). Cynicism was measured using the three-item scale developed by 
Tyler and Huo (2002). The scale asks participants to respond to items assessing their feeling 
that the law is against them (e.g., “people in power use the law to control people like me”). 
Participants responded to items in this scale using five-point scales labeled as follows: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly 
agree. 
The final construct was obligation to obey the law. This construct, which focuses internally 
on the trustors’ expectations of their own obligations, is relevant to the courts “having nei-
ther the power of the ‘purse’ (control of the treasury) nor the ‘sword’” (control over agents 
of state coercion; Gibson, 2008, p. 61). Thus, the courts are particularly reliant on internal-
ized obligations for obedience. The current measure of obligation to obey was adapted 
from Tyler & Huo (2002). Specifically, the items were “I feel I should accept the decisions 
of legal authorities” and “People should obey the law even when it goes against what they 
think is right.” Like cynicism, item responses were measured using five-point disa-
gree/agree scales. 
 
Analytic strategy 
The current study utilized latent measurement models to evaluate the constructs’ dimen-
sionality and reliability, as well as relationships among the constructs. Latent measure-
ment analyses isolate the variance in item responses that is shared and can therefore be 
reasonably assumed to be part of the latent or underlying trait of interest. Importantly, 
latent analyses provide tests of construct dimensionality and relationships by attempting 
to explain the covariance in responses using only the relationships specified by the model. 
This test is conducted by essentially subtracting the estimated covariance matrix from the 
data covariance matrix to create a single score (residual fit index) which represents the 
difference in covariance between the models. In the current studies, the data were evalu-
ated using Mplus v.6 and models were estimated using the Maximum Likelihood-Robust 
(MLR) estimator. The MLR estimator is equivalent to the more common Maximum Likeli-
hood (ML) estimator except for the inclusion of a scaling correction factor for non-normal 
data. Note that when the item responses are normal (scale factor = 1), the results of MLR 
converge to those of ML. 
In both of the current studies, all of the measures were first evaluated in a saturated 
confirmatory factor model. For ease of interpretation, the factors in these models were 
identified by setting the latent factor means to zero and the variances to one. This approach 
also allows all of the item loadings to be freely estimated. Scale reliability was next evalu-
ated using model-based reliability estimates, or omega (ω), which are computed by taking 
into account the proportion of the item’s variance which is (loading) and is not (residual 
variance) related to the latent factor (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2010). In observed variables 
analysis, reliability is usually considered “excellent” if greater than .9, “very good” if above 
.8, and “adequate” if at or above .7. Few explicit recommendations exist for latent reliability 
analyses but general convention is that latent analyses are more tolerant of low reliability 
than analyses using observed variables (Kline, 2011, p. 70). 
Model fit for both the measurement and structural models was evaluated via the Χ2 test 
of exact fit that tests whether a residual fit index is statistically significantly different from 
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zero. As a Χ2 test, however, the numeric difference from zero required for significance is 
dependent upon the size of the sample. With large samples and models with many degrees 
of freedom, a nonsignificant test of exact fit is therefore unlikely, so alternative fit indices 
are usually recommended for identifying good fit (Kline, 2011).We followed this advice 
and primarily emphasized the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; in which values higher than .9 
are indicative of sufficient fit) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; in which values higher than 
.9 are indicative of sufficient fit), Standardized Root Mean-Square Residual (SRMR; for 
which values lower than .08 are indicative of sufficient fit), and the Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) point estimate (in which values lower than .1 are indicative of 
sufficient fit; Brown & Cudeck, 1993) in evaluating the fit of our models. Potential sources 
of local misfit in the model were evaluated using the normalized residual covariance ma-
trix and modification indices (available in Mplus via the MODINDICES output option). 
Upon achieving sufficient fit, these latent factors were then subjected to structural linear 
regression to identify the independent predictive relationships of the four predictor con-
structs (dispositional trust, trust in governmental institutions, cynicism, and obligation to obey) 
with the criterion construct, confidence in the courts. Nested model comparisons were con-
ducted using the scaled change in Log-Likelihood (–2ΔLL), which identified significant 
changes in model fit as a function of the difference in the number of estimated parameters. 
 
Study 1 
 
Six hundred and ninety individuals, who had previously participated in an online public 
engagement survey about their local budgeting preferences, were emailed an invitation to 
take a follow-up online survey about city budgeting issues. The construct scales analyzed 
here were included as an optional appendix to the survey. Of the individuals who com-
pleted the appendix materials, slightly more than half were female (58%) and primarily 
white (97%); well educated (41% reported having at least some graduate school education); 
and middle-aged (48% reported being at least 55 years old). 
 
Results 
Because the scales analyzed here were an optional appendix, 517 participants were missing 
data on one or more of the scales and were therefore removed. The remaining 173 partici-
pants (25% of the original 690) were retained in the following analyses. ANOVAs were 
conducted comparing the means of participants with missing data to those without and 
failed to yield any significant differences between groups at p < .05. Item-level statistics 
were then evaluated (see table 3) and revealed good evidence for item factorability (i.e., 
item total correlations greater than .3). 
 
Measures evaluation 
As discussed in the analytic strategy section above, the measures were evaluated first us-
ing a confirmatory factor analysis model in which the structural model was saturated (i.e., 
all possible latent variable correlations were estimated; see fig. 2). Although the model 
failed to achieve exact fit, Χ2(110) = 174.01; p < .001 (scale factor = 1.07), comparison of al-
ternative fit indices with their suggested cutoffs indicated sufficient fit to the data (CFI = 
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.93 and TLI = .91, both > the .90 cutoff; SRMR = .06 < .08 cutoff; RMSEA = .05 < .10 cutoff, p = 
.20). All items’ standardized loadings on their factors were greater than .4 (see fig. 2 for 
standardized parameter estimates). Evaluation of the normalized residual covariance ma-
trix revealed no relatively large residual covariances. Coupled with only three modifica-
tion recommendations, this was taken as evidence of little local misfit in the model. Next, 
scale omegas were computed and were good (> .7) for dispositional trust and cynicism but 
somewhat limited for trust in governmental institutions and obligation to obey (< .6; see table 
4). Finally, latent factor intercorrelations were evaluated and indicated that all of the 
scales—except for obligation to obey, whose correlation with the other predictor variables 
was only marginal, r’s = .17–.19, p’s < .20—were significantly correlated (r’s ranging from 
.33 to. 70, p’s < .05; see table 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Study 1 measures evaluation model. 
Note: Pathways with asterisks’ (*) unstandardized estimates were constrained to be equal 
for local identification. Numbers within the item boxes correspond to the item numbers 
in table 3. λ = item loading. The numbers outside of the boxes with arrows pointing to 
them are the item errors. Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Gov-
ernmental Institutions; Cynicism = Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation 
to Obey the Law. 
 
Table 4. Study 1 latent measures reliability and correlations 
  Correlations 
Scale Omega Disp. Trust Trust in Gov. Cynicism Oblig. to Obey 
Disp. Trust .89 1 — — — 
Trust in Gov. .59 .46* 1 — — 
Cynicism .79 .30* .70* 1 — 
Oblig. to Obey .50 .18 .17 .19 1 
Confidence in the courts .81 .38* .66* .63* .33* 
Note: Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Governmental Institutions; Cynicism = 
Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation to Obey the Law. 
* p < .05. 
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Measures relationships 
Given the sufficient fit of the model, we next tested the hypothesis that the four predictor 
constructs accounted for significant unique variance in the criterion, confidence in the courts, 
which was identified by setting the first item as a marker. As an equivalent model, it also 
fit to the data, Χ2(110) = 174.01, p < .001 (scale factor = 1.07); CFI = .93; TLI = .91; SRMR = .06; 
RMSEA = .05, p = .20, but returned no statistically significant independent relationships 
between the predictors and criterion (see table 5). Given the correlated nature of the con-
structs, and the possibility that certain constructs might mediate the impact of others, is it 
possible that these nonsignificant effects were the result of multicollinearity (note, how-
ever, that this was not hypothesized and may not generalize to other analyses). The regres-
sion coefficient of the predictor with the smallest coefficient and highest p-value in 
predicting confidence in the courts, dispositional trust, was therefore set to zero—essentially 
removing the predictor from the model but keeping the two models nested, permitting 
model comparison. The model was not significantly less able to recreate the pattern of ob-
served covariance (2ΔLL (1) = .517, p = .47). The dispositional trust items and factor were 
thus removed from the model and the resultant structural regression model fit well to the 
data with all four alternative fit statistics indicating sufficient fit to the data (Χ2(111) = 
174.56, p <.001 (scale factor = 1.07); CFI = .93; TLI = .91; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .06, p = .21). 
Trust in government and obligation to obey significantly predicted confidence in the courts 
while cynicism remained nonsignificant (see table 5). The model accounted for 55% of the 
variance in the latent factor of confidence in the courts, and the regression coefficients re-
vealed positive relationships with it, such that a one standard deviation increase in trust in 
governmental institutions or a one standard deviation increase in obligation to obey would 
correspond to an increase of .71 or .31 in confidence in the courts, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Study 1 structural regressions predicting confidence in the courts 
    Parameter estimates 
Model 
Model 
Comparison 
Criterion 
R2 Predictor 
Unstd. 
Coeff. 
Std. 
Coeff. 
p- 
Value 
Complete model n/a R2 = .54* Disp. Trust .10 .07 .50 
   Trust in Gov. .58 .40 .11 
   Cynicism .43 .29 .15 
   Oblig. to Obey .28 .19 .06 
Dispositional trust removed –2ΔLL (1) = .52, 
p = .47 R2 = .55* Trust in Gov. .71 .48 .02 
   Cynicism .37 .25 .22 
   Oblig. to Obey .31 .21 .04 
Note: Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Governmental Institutions; Cynicism = 
Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation to Obey the Law. 
 
Discussion 
 
As hypothesized, the items used in this study were unidimensional indicators of their re-
spective latent factors. The sufficient fit of the measures evaluation model and the lack of 
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localized misfit indicate that the model was in fact able to reproduce the covariance in the 
data using only the relationships specified in the model. This supports the hypothesis that 
the relationships among the items measuring different constructs could be reasonably ex-
plained by the relationships among those latent constructs. The scale reliability hypothesis, 
however, was only partially supported. The scales were reasonably reliable (at least 50% 
of their shared variance was reliable), but the comparatively low omegas computed for the 
trust in government (ω = .59) and obligation to obey (ω = .50) scales indicate that there is room 
for improvement in these two scales. 
As shown in table 5, our second hypothesis, that the predictors would account for sig-
nificant independent variance in the criterion, was not supported in the complete model. 
The four predictor scales were not significant predictors of confidence in the courts, but they 
did show the expected pattern of directionally positive regression coefficients (note that 
cynicism was reverse coded such that increases in the variable indicated decreases in cyni-
cism). Suspecting a problem with multicollinearity, we removed the effect of the variable 
with the highest p-value and lowest regression coefficient, dispositional trust, and reesti-
mated the model. The ability of the reduced model to recreate the covariance in the data 
was not statistically different from the complete model, and the reduced model revealed 
the hypothesized significant positive prediction of confidence in the courts by trust in govern-
mental institutions and obligation to obey. However, cynicism was still not a significant pre-
dictor (see table 5). 
 
Study 2 
 
Participants for Study 2 were drawn from a field experiment which sought to decrease 
failure-to-appear rates in the state of Nebraska (Bornstein, Tomkins, Neeley, Herian, & 
Hamm, in press). Researchers surveyed 335 misdemeanor defendants who appeared in 
court for their initial arraignment and 117 who failed to appear (452 total). Racially, the 
sample was predominantly White (77.6%); Blacks and Hispanics comprised 7.8% and 5.7% 
of the sample, respectively. The majority of the sample was male (69.1%), with a mean age 
of 29.8. Previously reported analyses tested only the relationships between the confidence 
constructs and the respondent’s appearance in court, and, like our previous work, used 
only limited analyses of reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) and dimensionality (exploratory 
factor analyses). In addition, the prior analyses did not investigate the constructs’ multi-
variate relationships. 
 
Results 
As before, participants who were missing data on any of the scales were removed, (n = 61). 
ANOVAs were conducted comparing item means of participants with missing data to 
those without. Only one item (“judges in my community treat people with respect”) was 
significantly different between groups at p < .05. Thus, the 391 participants with complete 
data were used in the analyses. We then computed means, standard deviations, and item-
total correlations (within dimensions) and identified the items’ factorability as unproblem-
atic (see table 3). 
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Measures evaluation 
The measures evaluation model included all four predictor scales and the confidence in the 
courts criterion in a saturated confirmatory factor model. Again, exact fit failed to hold for 
the model, Χ2(110) = 266.16, p < .001 (correction factor = 1.16), but all four of the alternative 
fit indices indicated sufficient fit of the estimated covariance matrix to the data (CFI = .94; 
TLI = .92; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .06, p = .03). As in Study 1, all standardized item loadings 
were greater than .4 (see fig. 3 for standardized parameter estimates), and evaluation of 
the normalized residual covariance matrix revealed limited evidence of local misfit. The 
residual covariance of one of the cynicism items with one of the negatively worded confi-
dence in the courts items was larger than the others, but the good fit of the model made the 
inclusion of an error correlation unnecessary. The modification indices suggested 20 rec-
ommended modifications, but only three of them were comparatively large (Δx2 = 20). 
Given the good fit of the model and lacking theoretical justification for the modifications, 
no modifications were made. Omega was again computed for these scales and was ade-
quate for all scales except for obligation to obey (ω = .60). Finally, the scale interrelationships 
were evaluated and indicated that the scales were all significantly and positively correlated 
(see table 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 2 measures evaluation model. 
Note: Pathways with asterisks’ (*) unstandardized estimates were constrained to be equal 
for local identification. Numbers within the item boxes correspond to the item numbers 
in table 3. λ = item loading. The numbers outside of the boxes with arrows pointing to 
them are the item errors. Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Gov-
ernmental Institutions; Cynicism = Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation 
to Obey the Law. 
 
Measures relationships 
Next, the structural regression model was estimated. Because the model was again equiv-
alent to the measures evaluation model (note that, as in the previous structural regression, 
the criterion was identified by setting the first item loading to 1), it also fit to the data, as 
evidenced by the fact that both the CFI and TLI were above the minimum recommended 
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value of .9, the RMSEA was less than 1.0 and the SRMR was less than .8, (Χ2(110) = 266.16, 
p < .001 (correction factor = 1.16); CFI = .94; TLI = .92; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .06, p = .03) and 
left all item loadings significant on their factors. As hypothesized, most of the predictor 
scales significantly accounted for independent variance in the criterion, confidence in the 
courts (R2 = .66; see table 7). Trust in governmental institutions was most predictive with a 
one standard deviation increase in the construct corresponding to a .65 increase in confi-
dence in the courts. Cynicism and obligation to obey were equally predictive, both correspond-
ing to .48 increases. Dispositional trust, however, once again had no significant independent 
relationship. 
 
Table 6. Study 2 latent measures reliability and correlations 
  Correlations 
Scale Omega Disp. Trust Trust in Gov. Cynicism Oblig. to Obey 
Disp. Trust .73 1 — — — 
Trust in Gov. .87 .44* 1 — — 
Cynicism .79 .43* .55* 1 — 
Oblig. to Obey .60 .37 .61 .52 1 
Confidence in the courts .86 .43* .72* .65* .67* 
Note: Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Governmental Institutions; Cynicism = 
Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation to Obey the Law. 
* p < .05. 
 
Table 7. Study 2 structural regressions predicting confidence in the courts 
  Parameter estimates 
Criterion R2 Predictor scale Unstd. Coefficient Std. Coefficient p-Value 
R2 = .66* Disp. Trust .08 .05 .40 
 Trust in Gov. .65 .38 < .001 
 Cynicism .48 .28 .001 
 Oblig. to Obey .48 .28 < .001 
Note: Disp. Trust = Dispositional Trust; Trust in Gov. = Trust in Governmental Institutions; Cynicism = 
Cynicism toward the Law; Oblig. to Obey = Obligation to Obey the Law. 
* p < .05 
 
Discussion 
 
As in Study 1, our measurement hypothesis was largely supported by the results. The suf-
ficient fit of the measures evaluation model, coupled with the limited evidence of local 
misfit in the residual covariance matrix, indicated that, again, the relationships among the 
items from each scale could be said to be accounted for by their relationship to a common, 
underlying construct. The modification indices in this study did reveal more evidence for 
multivocality than the Study 1 data but did not result in an ill-fitting model. Additionally, 
the reliability of the scales in the Study 2 data was better than in Study 1, with all but one 
scale reporting approximately 80% of their variance as reliable. As in Study 1, however, 
obligation to obey’s reliability was limited, suggesting room for improvement. 
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The hypothesis that the four predictors would independently account for variance in 
confidence in the courts was partially supported. Three of the predictors’ regression coeffi-
cients were significant and indicated positive relationships with confidence in the courts (as 
before, cynicism was reverse coded before analysis). As in Study 1, trust in governmental 
institutions was most predictive of the criterion. Obligation to obey and cynicism were some-
what less related to the criterion, and dispositional trust had no predictive value. 
 
General discussion 
 
The findings of the current research advance the literature on confidence in the courts by 
providing additional evidence for the characteristics of and relationships among con-
structs commonly studied as pertaining to confidence in the courts. Regarding the charac-
teristics of the individual constructs and measures, the current research replicated the 
unidimensionality of the items hypothesized to measure the confidence-related constructs. 
In both studies, the alternative fit statistics from the measures evaluation models consist-
ently indicated that the relationships among the variables were sufficiently represented by 
the relationships among their underlying latent constructs. The small increase in multivo-
cality of the scales in Study 2 does suggest that misdemeanants’ perceptions may be 
slightly less differentiated than community members’ perceptions, but the sufficient fit of 
both models indicates that the factor structure holds across samples. 
Reliability, however, was somewhat problematic for some of the scales, underscoring a 
need for improvement in the scales themselves and for the use of latent measurement anal-
yses to separate this error from the shared variance which can reasonably be argued to be 
the “true score.” The measure of trust in governmental institutions was somewhat less re-
liable in the first study as compared to the second. It is possible that the civic engagement 
of the community members in Study 1 may have led to more developed perceptions of the 
city government as compared to state or federal government, decreasing the scale’s relia-
bility in the first study. Alternatively, the experiences of the defendants may have led them 
to have a more unified perception of all authority, thereby increasing the reliability in the 
second study. 
In both studies, however, the obligation to obey items were particularly plagued with 
variance not relating to a common factor. Our previous work with this construct has also 
found low reliability (Hamm et al., 2011), and the present findings provide additional ev-
idence that the items may tap somewhat different constructs, particularly in nonstudent 
samples. The low reliability might be the result of the fact that while the first item is a 
straightforward assessment of obligation (“I feel I should accept the decisions made by 
legal authorities”), the second item seems to pit obedience to legal authority against per-
sonal morality (“People should obey the law even when it goes against what they think is 
right”). Additionally, the third item of the original scale (not used in this article, but in-
cluded in Hamm et al., 2011) goes even a step further and measures the extent to which 
obedience to the law has been incorporated into the respondents’ self-concept (“It is diffi-
cult to break the law and keep one’s self-respect”). Given the face validity of the first item, 
future researchers may wish to develop new items more closely correlated with this item 
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for a more reliable multi-item measure of obligation to obey the law. Note that these in-
creases in reliability are likely to increase the fit of the models, which, although sufficient, 
were more limited in Study 1 as compared to Study 2. 
The structural regressions revealed that the latent predictor constructs accounted for 
roughly half of the variability in people’s evaluations of their confidence in the courts. 
However, as in our previous work, not all of the constructs were predictive of confidence 
in the courts across models. Unlike the previous article, dispositional trust did not have a 
significant influence on the criterion in either Study 1 or Study 2. One possible explanation 
would be that, consistent with previous work regarding sophistication with an institu-
tion/authority (e.g., Herian et al., 2012; Lubell, 2007; van den Bos, 2001), these patterns of 
results suggest that the bases of perceptions like confidence in an institution may change 
from global to more institution-specific as the trustor becomes more sophisticated in his or 
her knowledge of the attributes and processes used by an institution. 
Although sophistication was not measured directly in the present research, we might 
expect the engaged adults from Study 1 to have relatively high knowledge of government 
generally by virtue of their civic engagement. The misdemeanor defendants in Study 2 are, 
by definition, more sophisticated in their knowledge and experience of the courts in rela-
tion to the “average” citizen, given that misdemeanor defendants came into direct contact 
with the courts. The pattern of results across the present studies and our previous work is 
such that the most general of the constructs, dispositional trust, did not have a significant 
independent relationship with confidence in the courts for the current, likely more knowl-
edgeable and experienced, participants. Furthermore, dispositional trust was the predictor 
with the smallest—albeit significant—bivariate relationship with confidence in the courts 
in both of the current studies. Conversely, in the previous work, the relatively unsophisti-
cated students’ confidence in the courts was significantly predicted by dispositional trust 
in all five cross-sectional item total regressions. Although the results in the student (least 
sophisticated) and defendant (most sophisticated) samples are unsurprising in light of this 
sophistication postulation, the community sample results are less clear. Given the status of 
the community sample as civically engaged (recall that these participants had already par-
ticipated in a city budgeting survey), they would likely be more sophisticated than stu-
dents regarding government generally, potentially explaining dispositional trust’s lack of 
an independent relationship with confidence in this sample. This explanation, though we 
believe compelling, is not directly testable in the current data. Thus, additional research is 
needed to address this speculation. 
The reasons for the varied relationships between confidence in the courts and trust in 
governmental institutions is equally unclear but reasonable in light of the sophistication 
hypothesis. In both of the models tested in the present research, trust in governmental in-
stitutions was the strongest predictor of confidence in the courts. In the previous samples 
of students (Hamm et al., 2011), trust in government was similarly strong in Study 2, but 
in Study 1 it was significant only when predicting confidence assessed with an emphasis 
on specific expectations. Notably, however, Study 2 of the previous research utilized a 
slightly modified version of the trust in government scale. Specifically, the scale was mod-
ified to include four other institutions thought to be more relevant to students (the Presi-
dent, the university administration, the United States Supreme Court, and the United 
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States military). Because this scale was modified, its ability to predict confidence in the 
courts in the student sample may have increased. If true, consideration in light of the so-
phistication hypothesis would indicate that for individuals who are more knowledgeable 
of the measured institutions, the more specific trust construct (trust in institutions versus 
trust in people generally) has a stronger influence on confidence evaluations. 
Obligation to obey and cynicism were more consistent in their ability to predict confi-
dence in the courts across articles. In the current article and our previous work, obligation 
to obey was frequently a significant predictor. Cynicism also tended to predict confidence 
in the courts, predicting it significantly for the misdemeanant sample in the current article, 
and also predicting confidence assessed as perceptions of trustworthiness, in all three Time 
1 cross-sectional analyses of our previous work. Conversely, other results from our previ-
ous work indicated that cynicism was not a significant predictor of trustworthiness-based 
confidence in the courts in the longitudinal model or cross-sectionally at Time 2, nor was 
it significant in Study 1 of the current article. Thus, these results seem to indicate that, at 
least under some circumstances, obligation to obey and cynicism are important aspects of 
confidence in the courts, but further research is needed to understand their inconsistent 
predictive ability. 
 
Implications 
The current research contributes to the understanding of confidence in the courts. Our 
findings have specific implications for both theoretical research investigating confidence 
in the courts and court practice. We identify three constructs that are important for indi-
viduals’ confidence in the courts. Roughly half of the variance in confidence assessments 
was accounted for by some combination of the three predictor constructs. 
The fact that dispositional trust was a consistently poor predictor of individuals’ confidence 
in the courts holds out hope that courts can work to increase public confidence. Although it 
would be hard to argue that the courts could have much influence on how much individ-
uals trust others generally, the courts do have a central influence on how the public per-
ceives government, the presented “intentions” of the law, and potentially, therefore, the 
resulting willingness to obey them. 
The results also indicate that the effects of the various related constructs are not con-
sistent. The current research suggests that, in line with other researchers’ arguments both 
in the governmental context (e.g., Herian et al. 2012) and in other domains (e.g., Siegrist & 
Cvetkovich 2000; Winter & Cvetkovich 2008), the sophistication of the evaluator may be 
an important construct for understanding that person’s confidence in an institution. More-
over, it also points to the importance of how confidence (or trust) is conceptualized and 
measured. 
In conclusion, the present studies demonstrate the importance of several distinct trust-
related constructs—dispositional trust, trust in governmental institutions, cynicism to-
ward the law, and obligation to obey the law—for predicting confidence in the courts. Spe-
cifically, while trust in governmental institutions, cynicism toward the law and obligation 
to obey it seem to be important considerations in determining confidence in the courts, 
dispositional trust seems to be much less important for sophisticated individuals relative 
to the other predictors. Additionally, although the measures used in this study appear to 
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be reasonably reliable and unidimensional, there remains a considerable amount of unex-
plained variance in confidence in the courts. Given the importance of confidence and in 
light of the current ambiguity about what precisely is meant by and how best to measure 
these related constructs, research like that reported here is not only critical for theoretical 
development, but it also has the potential to contribute to effective and efficient govern-
ance. 
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